




EU policymakers are currently hotly debating how 
the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) will budget for the 2021-2027 period. For the 
MFF area dedicated to external action, the European 
Commission has proposed a new mega instrument 
that will significantly shape the EU’s relations with 
third countries: the Neighbourhood, Development 
and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). 
With a proposed budget of €89.2 billion, NDICI will 
give substantial impetus to the EU’s development 
cooperation in the years to come. Exactly which 
features will be included in the instrument are still 
unclear, as negotiations in the Council and the European 
Parliament are still ongoing. However, member states 
have decided to follow the Commission’s proposal that 
10% of the NDICI be earmarked for migration-related 
spending (ECRE 2019). With that amount standing at 
€8.9 billion if based on the current proposal, this would 
significantly shift the NDICI’s focus towards migration 
(ECRE 2019). In this situation, tackling the root causes 
of irregular migration and forced displacement in third 
countries will be a cornerstone of EU external action. 
For the next eight years, the nexus between migration 
and development will thus take centre stage in the EU’s 
development assistance initiatives.
In this context, it is worth reflecting on the EU’s current 
migration and development policies in order to inform 
the negotiations on the NDICI. A closer look reveals 
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that they are more controversial than would appear at 
first glance. These policies combine development and 
migration policy issues in ways that are sometimes 
contradictory, thereby inhibiting their effectiveness. It 
is thus imperative that we draw lessons from the EU’s 
present external migration policies and its approach to 
development cooperation, as this will help foster more 
effective and evidence-based policymaking in this area 
in the future. To that end, this policy brief outlines the 
EU’s current migration and development policies and 
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then looks at two examples (aid conditionality and the 
emphasis on short-term versus long-term objectives) 
to show that migration governance and development 
cooperation are not always complementary and 
coherent. In concluding, this brief offers another 
perspective on the current debate on NDICI.
The approach of tackling the root causes of 
migration with development aid
In its policies addressing migration and displacement 
issues in third countries, the EU often uses development 
cooperation as an instrument and a funding scheme 
(cf. Caso 2007; Castillejo 2018). It has buttressed this 
approach especially since 2015, when the influx of 
immigrants increased. The idea is to “tackle the root 
causes of irregular migration and forced displacement” 
(Commission 2018) with development cooperation in 
origin and transit countries.
At first glance, this strategy seems to make sense. 
This approach follows the logic that people migrate 
due to poverty, instability, conflict, and natural disasters- 
aspects of underdevelopment that lead to a lack of 
opportunities at home. Development cooperation -so 
the theory goes- can mitigate these factors and improve 
livelihoods in origin countries, thereby reducing irregular 
and forced migration to Europe (cf. Valletta Summit on 
Migration 2015; Commission 2015; Commission 2011; 
Commission 2002). Such an approach would seem to 
support the interests of all parties involved: prospective 
migrants, European destination countries, and home 
countries. The assumption is that prospective migrants 
generally want to stay in their home countries, such 
that enhancing living conditions through development 
cooperation is in their interest. Countries of transit and 
origin, which often lack basic resources, would benefit 
from development assistance. Finally, the EU as a 
destination area would benefit from a decrease in the 
pressure from irregular migration. 
According to this approach, development in transit 
and origin countries and the reduction of irregular 
migration to Europe complement each other, with 
the former following the latter in a relatively neat 
relationship. At a policy level, the assumption is that 
the EU can decrease irregular migration and forced 
displacement by using development cooperation to 
tackle their root causes. This approach declares to put 
support to the people in origin and transit countries 
at the centre of EU external action. After all, they are 
the ones who deserve to earn a livelihood at home. Of 
course, it is difficult to argue against this, “as it is also 
not an option to just keep them poor” (Interview with 
Commission official, May 2019). Thus, development 
assistance for reducing irregular migration pressure 
on Europe and for supporting prospective migrants 
to stay at home allegedly is a straightforward and 
indisputable strategy. Above all, this strategy seems to 
address migration and development in a coherent way.
Aid conditionality and a short-term logic
On second glance, however, the coherence between the 
EU’s external migration policies and its development 
cooperation is not so strong (cf. Castillejo 2016; Den 
Hertog 2016). In some instances, the inherent logics 
of migration policies and development cooperation 
contradict each other, at times leading to an incoherent 
policy approach to EU external relations. 
First, external migration policymaking uses the 
principle of aid conditionality to induce third 
countries’ adherence to the EU’s migration agenda 
(Castillejo 2018, Den Hertog 2016). There is a trend 
in the EU towards linking development assistance to 
compliance with respect to return and readmission, 
which is a clear case of conditionality (Castillejo 2016, 
Den Hertog 2016). In the NDICI, 10% of the funding 
may be used in accordance with a more-for-more logic, 
to reward third countries for their progress in migration 
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management and control, among other areas (cf. 
Commission 2018). The more-for-more principle 
is an example of positive conditionality that uses 
development cooperation funding as a “carrot” for 
third countries that comply with the EU’s objectives. 
Negative conditionality of withholding development aid 
for cases when a third country does not abide by the 
EU’s agenda can be termed “less-for-less.” EU member 
states are divided as to whether conditionality should 
be positive or negative (Castillejo 2016), in the sense 
of a carrot or a stick. Notwithstanding this discussion, 
the policy trend is to make development cooperation a 
tool for promoting EU interests via aid conditionality. 
This goes against the principles of development 
cooperation, which denounce aid conditionality and 
maintain that aid should be based on need and not 
on compliance with an external agenda. At present, 
the migration and development policies of the EU are 
in a predicament with respect to conditionality: they 
risk undermining development cooperation principles 
by making aid conditional on adherence to the EU’s 
migration interests, rather than focusing on the goal 
of reducing poverty. Development aid principles aside, 
such a policy is also flawed at the substantive level. 
Disbursing or withholding aid according to third 
countries’ compliance might actually increase irregular 
and forced migration to the EU instead of reducing it. 
In this sense, aid conditionality goes against the very 
premises upon which this policy is built. 
Second, migration policies focus on short-term goals 
instead of the long-term objectives that development 
cooperation policies emphasize. The EU’s aim to 
offer short-term responses and maintain flexibility 
with respect to migration might hinder the long-
term perspective and sustainability objectives of 
its development cooperation. In some cases, the 
long-term development needs of third countries 
even conflict with the EU’s short-term migration 
interests (Den Hertog 2016). In such instances, the 
logic inherent to development cooperation possibly 
contradicts that of migration politics, with the latter 
often gaining priority over the former. Indeed, the term 
“root causes” itself requires an emphasis on long-
term objectives, but the EU’s focus on the reduction 
of arrivals runs counter to this. For example, there 
is a contradiction between a root causes approach 
to migration and a short-term emergency fund to 
address these root causes – as is the case with the 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (Castillejo 2016). 
Regarding the NDICI, the Commission acknowledges 
this possible conflict and stresses that the proposed 
instrument will mobilise “short-term, medium-term 
and long-term action in a streamlined manner” 
and “ensure complementarity between short- and 
long-term actions” (Commission 2018). Sufficient 
safeguards should be in place to ensure that the 
NDICI will actually address the possible trade-offs 
between a short-term versus a long-term approach 
to migration and development. Otherwise, the NDICI 
would risk adhering to a migration policy rationale to 
the detriment of development cooperation. This would 
undermine the very “root causes” approach that this 
instrument is supposed to address. 
While a holistic approach requires that the twin 
topics of migration and development in origin and 
transit countries be considered side by side, the 
perspective that development policy can bring to the 
table is necessarily focused on long-term aspects 
of the migration phenomenon, as well as on the 
non-conditionality of aid. The short-term aspects 
of migration are very relevant, but trying to address 
them by making aid conditional on third-country 
compliance with EU objectives undermines the 
principles of development cooperation and the logic 
of the approach itself. 
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Conclusion
Migration and development of origin and transit 
countries influence each other and are closely 
interrelated, which is why it makes sense to address 
them in a concerted manner through a policy 
that encompasses both external migration and 
development. In shifting its development cooperation 
to focus on the area of migration, the EU recognizes 
this connection. However, at this crucial point in time 
and with a view to the NDICI negotiations, the EU 
policies on migration and development need closer 
examination. 
Indeed, the development cooperation policies and 
the external migration policies put forth by the 
European Union are not always coherent. Regarding 
aid conditionality and perspective (long-term versus 
short-term goals), they follow conflicting and possibly 
contradictory rationales. These rationales are inherent 
to each of the two policy fields, and reconciling them 
is a difficult task. Nevertheless, it is paramount that 
policymakers find a way to “address the current 
migration challenge without jeopardizing development 
policy achievements and objectives” (European 
Parliamentary Research Service 2017). The task for 
the EU is to consider the respective contributions 
of migration policies and development cooperation 
to the migration phenomenon in accordance with 
the specific logic of each. Given that development 
cooperation focuses on the long-term aspects of 
migration, development policy should not be shaped 
by the immediate political priorities of the Union. If 
one accepts that migration and development are 
closely related- as the EU does- then undermining 
development principles through conditionality and 
adopting policies that have short-term objectives 
might negatively impact on migration itself, and 
might even foster irregular and forced migration. 
Thus, policymakers should address the underlying 
causes of migration through a holistic development 
policy that treats development and migration in the 
broadest sense. One way to do this would be to 
recognize that migration, if organized in a safe and 
orderly way, can sometimes benefit the development 
of origin countries. Following such an approach does 
not mean that the short-term aspects of migration 
should be ignored, but only that development 
cooperation funds and instruments should not be 
focused on the immediate goals on migration. Indeed, 
if the EU really aims to address the structural causes 
of irregular and forced migration and recognizes that 
these phenomena require a development perspective, 
it should consider the links between migration, 
development, trade, finance, energy, security policies, 
the external aspects of the common agricultural 
and fisheries policy, natural degradation and climate 
change. This is especially crucial in the context of the 
current NDICI negotiations, given that this instrument 
will significantly shape future policies in the area of 
development and migration.
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